大家都在唱衰中國, 但過去20年他們進步很多
以前講到中國青海省, 大家想到什麼, 地產不豐, 環境氣候惡劣
問年輕人考上大學, 假如學校在青海省, 想不想去念啊 ~
Coal shortages, covid-19 and a construction
slowdown all take their toll
In a scene from
“Manufactured Landscapes”, a documentary released in 2006, Edward Burtynsky, a
landscape photographer, seeks permission to take pictures of the black
mountains of Chinese coal awaiting shipment in Tianjin, an industrial city near
Beijing. “Through his camera lens, through his eyes, it will appear beautiful,”
Mr Burtynsky’s assistant assures his sceptical host. That turns out to be not
quite true. Through the photographer’s lens, the piles of coal have a dark,
satanic geometry—not beautiful exactly, but awe-inspiring in their immensity.
It is hard to imagine China could ever
run shortage of this fuel. But in recent months, the black pyramids(金字塔) have been not
quite immense enough. A scarcity of coal, which accounts for almost two-thirds
of China’s electricity generation, has contributed to the worst power cuts in a
decade. And the blackouts have, in turn, hurt growth. “Our economy is
developing very fast,” Mr Burtynsky’s host tells him, so as to excuse the gloom
and dirt in the air. But that is not quite true any more either.
 |
| 中國青海省西寧市 中心商業區 |
The Chinese economy has been hit by a triple shock, stemming not only from the power cuts but also the pandemic and a property slowdown exacerbated by the financial woes of Evergrande, a developer. Figures published on October 18th showed that economic growth slowed to 4.9% in the third quarter, compared with a year earlier (see chart). Industrial production expanded by only 3.1% year-on-year in September, slower than in any month during the global financial crisis. More than a year and a half after covid-19 first struck, China is reporting growth rates that were unheard of before the pandemic.
Consider the
energy crunch first. The causes of the coal shortage fall into two categories:
structural and incidental. The unlucky contingencies include floods in Henan
province in July and in Shanxi this month, which forced some mines to close. In
addition, in Inner Mongolia, which accounts for about a quarter of China’s coal
output, an investigation into corruption has implicated and hamstrung some of
the officials who might previously have approved expansions in coal mining.
Shaanxi province, China’s third-largest producer of coal, slowed production to
keep the skies clear for a national athletics event in September, which
President Xi Jinping attended. And coal expansion has also been inhibited by
safety inspectors, who have scrutinised 976 mines, after more than 100
industrial accidents nationwide last year.
scrutinised 嚴格審查
The deeper reason
for the coal crunch is China’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the fuel,
which is responsible for a big share of the country’s carbon emissions. The
authorities have been reluctant to approve new mines or the expansion of
existing ones in recent years, because “it’s clearly driving the bus in the
wrong direction”, says David Fishman of The Lantau Group, an energy
consultancy.
When supply is
tight, prices are supposed to rise, obliging customers to economise on their
consumption. But as the price of coal shot up, power stations were unable to
pass their higher costs on. The amount they could charge the grid company that
buys the bulk of their power could rise only up to 10% above a regulated price,
which was changed infrequently. And the tariff paid by end-users was based on a
catalogue of prices that was similarly inflexible. Some power stations simply
stopped operating, refusing to generate at a loss.
Another shock to
the economy came from the pandemic. Outbreaks of covid-19, such as a cluster
that began in Nanjing in July, prompted strict, localized lockdowns, depressing
retail spending, especially catering, and travel. According to Flight Master, a
travel site, airlines were operating at less than half their full capacity in
August and at only two-thirds of it in September.
我希望傷害是有限的, 因為國內旅遊業, 非民生必需消費產業(形象消費, 文教娛樂, 網路娛樂) 在中國已經漸漸重啟營運
The final shock was to the country’s property sector, a perennial engine of growth, employment, leverage and anxiety. Regulators are trying to curb speculative demand for flats and limit the excessive borrowing of homebuilders. That effort to limit financial risk has brought some existing dangers to a head.
想要抑制房地產泡沫, 但縮減資金供給, 造成地產開發商營運資金不足, 跳票危機
Evergrande, huge firm with $300bn in liabilities, missed a payment on a dollar bond on September 24th, and has been followed by others. Some homebuyers are now understandably nervous about handing over their cash to any developer who may not be in business long enough to finish the projects they are selling.
 |
| 西寧市街景 |
Against this backdrop, China’s developers started 13.5% fewer homes this September than they had a year earlier and their sales, measured by floorspace, fell by a similar percentage. China also reported sharp falls in the production of cement (down by 13% in September compared with last year) and steel (which fell by 14.8%).
On October 15th
China’s central bank described Evergrande as an idiosyncratic case in a
generally healthy industry. That should have been reassuring, except that
policymakers will not come to the property sector’s rescue until they are
sufficiently worried about its plight. Anxiety among regulators may be a
necessary condition for alleviating the anxiety of homebuilders and their
creditors.
Most economists
think China’s year-on-year growth will slow even further in the last three
months of the year. Bank of America has forecast growth of 2.5% in a base case.
China will maintain its vigilance against covid-19, and the property downturn
has further to run. But one of the three whammies should at least pack less of
a punch in the remainder of the year. Power stations, unlike property
developers, have won belated relief from higher authorities. Mines have been
ordered to expand production. And China’s principal planning body threatened on
October 19th to step in if coal prices remain punishingly high, prompting a
sharp sell-off of coal futures.
That threat of
intervention in upstream pricing followed a big step towards liberalisation
further downstream. The government will give power stations more freedom to
pass on higher costs to the grid company. It will also force industrial and
commercial customers (but not households or farmers) to pay power prices
negotiated in the market, not those set down in a catalogue. These reforms have
been in the works for a long time. But it took an acute crisis to force the
issue. Policymakers might once have preferred a “measured roll-out of market
reforms”, notes Mr Fishman. But things changed “when the lights started to go
out in factories across the country”. China likes to cross rivers by feeling
for the stones. But when a stone gives way, it is time to take a leap.
西寧市 風格潮店
探討一下中國中產人口真實情況
本文刊發於《中國經濟周刊》2016年第44期)
不久前，一條因“年收入12萬元以上被定為高收入群體，要加稅”的新聞，給所謂的“高收入群體”帶來不小的恐慌，並引發“中產階層”的集體吐槽。盡管財政部、國家稅務總局專家對此進行了辟謠，但是由此引發的話題仍持續發酵。
11月2日，經濟學人智庫(Economist Intelligence Unit)最新發布的報告顯示，作為世界第二大經濟體，中國將在2030年前邁入中等收入國家的行列，3/4的中國人將成為中產，讓“中產階層”再度成為焦點。
中國勞動學會副會長蘇海南接受《中國經濟周刊》記者採訪時表示，我國目前已經邁入中等偏上收入國家的行列，但是我國中等收入群體佔社會總人口的比重不到20%，明顯低於與我國處在相同發展階段國家的水平。當務之急是如何擴大中產階層的數量。
這個數據跟中國的現實國情相比，顯然不符。
由於現階段我國社會平均工資收入不高，大多數勞動者的收入處於平均數以下，社會分配格局還遠不是市場經濟發達國家的“橄欖形”，而是底部偏大、中上部偏細尖的“金字塔形”，據此，蘇海南認為，不宜簡單套用國際上確定中產階層或中等收入群體的標准。
基於多年研究，蘇海南對中國中產階層做了嚴格界定：其收入處於全國或當地社會平均水平與較高水平之間、其家庭生活水平達到全國或當地小康與比較富裕程度之間的人員。
具體量化標准是：中產階層成員的收入在各地城鎮居民家庭人均收入的平均值與平均值的2.5倍之間，即從全國層面看，2013年勞動者個人年收入在6萬至15萬元或家庭收入在8.5萬至22.5萬元，家庭人均住房達到全國平均水平及以上且另有一定數量金融資產者，就可以認為進入了中產階層﹔而在北上廣深，收入則須達到全國平均值的兩倍，即2013年個人年收入12萬至30萬元或家庭年收入17萬至45萬，且其住房問題基本解決並另有一定金融資產者，才能在當地稱為中產階層。
按照以上定義，蘇海南根據國家統計局發布的數據並參考一些研究機構對居民家庭收入調查數據測算得出：目前我國中等收入勞動者有1.6億多，約佔全國從業人員總數7.7億的20%﹔加上其贍養人口合計約為2.4億人以上，約佔全國人口總數13.67億的18%。當然，今年已經進入2016年，上述收入和財產標准區間也應適當提高，中產階層人數和比重也可能會有所變化。
中華人民共和國國家發展和改革委員會
資料
新世纪前15年，中国居民收入差距出现了一个由升转降的过程，衡量收入差距的基尼系数从2003年的0.48上升到2008年的0.49，然后下降到2015年的0.464。然而，从2016年开始，收入差距又出现了小幅度反弹，到2018年回升到0.469。这表明过去10年居民收入差距基本上处于高位徘徊波动状态。
这样的趋势得到了更多研究者认同。“缩小贫富差距是走向共同富裕的根本要求。近年来，伴随脱贫攻坚任务的完成和全面建成小康社会，贫富差距缩小之态势日益明显，但差距仍然偏大。要解决这一问题，必须重塑我国的收入分配制度，在初次分配、再分配与第三次分配同时发力。”郑功成认为。
构建“橄榄型”社会，关键在于扩大“橄榄型”中的中等收入阶层。
中国社会科学院原副院长、国家高端智库首席专家蔡昉认为，扩大中等收入群体是提高居民收入和消费水平，提高基本公共服务水平和均等化程度，以及促进安定团结、提高社会凝聚力的重要途径。
在蔡昉看来，中等收入群体的定义也不仅限于收入水平一个指标，还应该包括其他与人民生活品质相关的内容，“总体来说，中等收入群体应该具有在全社会处于中等水平的收入、稳定的就业、符合基本需要的居住条件、充分供给的基本公共服务、一定数量的家庭储蓄和适度的财产收入，并且具有超过基本生存需要的相关消费等”。
2.社会流动：防止“你挤上来我就掉下去”
掏空钱包跟家里借了钱付了首付，月供近10000元，交通费500元，加上每月税费扣除、伙食费等必需花销，在北京工作了9年的杨刚在买房之后成了“月光族”。月薪16000元的他并不认为自己是一线城市的中产阶层，“现金流绷得很紧，不敢生病，每个月都要盘算钱怎么省着花，要不就供不起房了”。
实际上，像杨刚这样，收入水平符合“中产”层级，却几乎抵御不了突发事件且收入不稳定的“中产”，目前还有很多。
“由于中等收入群体本来易受经济发展周期的影响，在经济下行压力加大、产业结构转型升级、职业结构快速变化的状况下，加之新冠肺炎疫情可能会持续较长一段时期，中产阶级的不安全感会上升，内心不确定性也会增加，担心自己被时代淘汰而失去工作，现在的中产生活水准降低，甚至有坠入贫困阶层的恐惧。”中国劳动和社会保障科学研究院副院长莫荣坦言。
房贷、车贷、医疗、养老……重重压力让不少中等收入群体“喊累”。“有的朋友买了房之后每个月的消费额度就给自己留了1000块。”杨刚对记者说，通过自己的努力从小城市“落脚”到一线城市，算是摸到了中产的边儿，但大家都有很强的焦虑感，尤其是对于孩子的教育，“怕再掉下去”。
这种焦虑感，无疑源自占比较大的刚性支出、对未来不确定性的担忧。而扩大中等收入群体，其核心要义就是要消除这些后顾之忧，加速社会流动。
蔡昉分析指出，历史上的社会流动，主要是横向流动，横向流动中也有纵向流动，比如居民收入、身份、地位的提高，以及岗位提升等。
而现在，我国已经进入中高速增长时期，劳动力的流动显著放慢，这个时候，更应关注向上的纵向流动。“如果没有切实的手段，社会性流动容易变成零合博弈，相当于挤一辆公共汽车，你挤上来我就掉下去，这种现象如果发生，也会产生社会冲突。”蔡昉形象地做出这个比喻。
为扩大中等收入群体，蔡昉提出了“倍增计划”，并将这一计划聚焦脱贫后低收入农村人口、进城农民工、老年人三大群体。
党的十八大以来，我国有接近1亿的农村绝对贫困人口脱贫，但仍是低收入群体。“经合组织国家的相对贫困标准是居民收入中位数的50%。2019年，我国农村居民收入中位数是14389元，它的50%就是7195元。假设30%的农村家庭符合这个标准，总人数至少为1.53亿，数量非常可观。如果能够把这部分人群培育为中等收入群体，将创造又一个共同富裕奇迹。”蔡昉算了一笔账。
与此同时，如果能够把2.91亿外出农民工和2.7亿60岁以上人口变成中等收入群体，不仅符合共同富裕的社会进程，对于继续支撑中国经济持续增长意义巨大。
郑功成则认为，要破除利益固化的樊篱，完善共享制度安排：加快完善社会保障制度，尽快优化并健全养老保险、医疗保障、社会救助等制度安排，全面加快各项福利事业的发展步伐，切实解除全民后顾之忧；加快推进基本公共服务均等化，特别是面向老人、儿童、妇女及残疾人的公共服务要统筹规划，以便让城乡居民真正实现全面普享
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