沒有對手的競爭: 提高市場障礙的求勝法則 Competition Demystified

Chapter 7  

The first obstacles : The record companies would not want to produce multiple versions of the same music, nor would the potential manufacturers of disc players be as eager to get involved without some guarantee of a large market 

The second potential obstacle was the relationship between cost and price. To be successful, the compact disc would have to be offered at a price that would be sufficiently competitive with the alternatives to attract enough customers to make the business profitable. The disc player would also have to be available at a price consumers would pay, The more difficult question was the cost of putting the music on a compact disc and moving it down the distribution channel until it reached the ultimate buyer. 

Demand and Supply

Within the U.S. market, they bought around 25 million records in 1979, less than 10 percent of the total number of LPs sold. As a group, these listeners had already shown a willingness to pay a 30 percent premium for digitally remastered records

The executives estimated that it would take around five years before even half of this market made the move to compact disc. They figured that annual demand would exceed 18 million discs by the third year after introduction and 120 million by the seventh year. 

. 

1960-70 年代發生過什麼 ! , 再回過頭看2020 ( 一 )

很多市場老手有經歷過1990年代初期以及2000科技泡沫, 對於這次2018-2019 最後2年走勢都摸不著頭緒, 其實2010以後的低利率, 早有歐美一些經濟學者把它拿來跟After World war 2 二次大戰後低利率時期相比 ( 大家可上 Macrotrend 網站一查)  本篇報告聚焦在1965 -1975這段期間 Fed 也是瘋狂印鈔票, 終至1975年發生無法挽救的高通膨 -高失業率, 大家興趣看完本篇摘要, 可想想目前2020大環境跟1970年代 有哪些類似之處 !  ( 節省時間者, 可直接文拉到最後, 有做後論心得, 最簡單明白 )

https://www.sitkapacific.com/recent-letters/Sitka_Pacific_July-August_2020_Client_Letter.pdf

原文鏈結來自Sitka Pacific Capital Management, LLC經理人 Brian McAuley , 認為他的觀點不錯, 本人做重點翻譯( 有錯誤歡迎指正 )

As the Fed’s zero percent interest rate policy and quantitative easing continued for years after the end of the Great Recession in 2009, the dip into negative real territory out on the long end of the Treasury yield curve in 2011 prompted a rush into gold — a rush which then came to a sudden end in 2013, during the market’s “Taper Tantrum.” During that tantrum, the real 10-Year Treasury yield quickly rose to positive 1% from negative 1% in just a few months, and gold fell alongside bond prices. Yet as sudden as the shift back to positive real rates was, the positive 1% level remained a ceiling for the real 10-Year Treasury rate while the bubble cycle in risk assets repeated a third time.( 不斷一次又一次發生） It remained below that level until its brief peek above it in late 2018. That brief rise above 1% was enough to cause the steep selloff in risk assets into the end of 2018 and bring a premature end to the Fed’s campaign to raise short-term interest rates.

金融海嘯過後2009 年公債殖利率進入短暫負利率時期( 大家搶著買公債), 間接造成其餘投資人去搶買黃金 ( 另一原因是中國大媽搶買 Gold) , 這波公債-黃金避險風潮在2013年劃下休止符, 之後市場先生從海嘯變臉時期過渡到Taper Tantrum( 偶爾發火)時期. 公債短暫幾個月就從 - 1%回升到+ 1%, 金價跟著滑落下來. 而殖利率 1%這個數字此後成為2010 -2018期間的一個天花板, 直到2018年底市場試探的將殖利率衝稍微高於 1%, 沒想到引發股票市場某些資金轉移性賣壓, 提前結束Fed調高短期利率的貨幣政策

notes for small report

But in practice industrial policy is hard to get right. Helping companies is as likely to promote laziness as competitiveness. Moreover, officials may be no better—and perhaps much worse—than business people in choosing which industries to support.

State Grid Corporation of China 


One tentative conclusion is that China’s industrial policy works better when natural monopolies are involved. There is a clear role for a central authority with strong organising power to develop a power-transmission system or a high-speed rail network. Yet that same authority can stifle competition in sectors that need it. Alternatively, as often occurs in China, if lots of provincial governments try to foster their own champions, nominally in pursuit of national objectives, the outcome is extreme over-capacity, which undermines the targeted sector.


Ernest Liu of Princeton University argues that state support is most effective when it targets those sectors that make the most essential inputs for others. Generally, these are upstream; turning raw materials into products used in a range of industries. Subsidies for them, even via state firms, can raise overall efficiency.

如何計算投資的報酬/風險比例

https://blog.xuite.net/sandpiper/FX/31336442-%E5%A6%82%E4%BD%95%E8%A8%88%E7%AE%97%E6%8A%95%E8%B3%87%E7%9A%84%E5%A0%B1%E9%85%AC%2F%E9%A2%A8%E9%9A%AA%E6%AF%94%E4%BE%8B

猜對幾次 ~ 猜錯幾次

 Apri 2011 1722 台肥  猜對,  (但追不上 , 大跌後法人連拉3根漲停 )

Sep 2012  2498 宏達電  猜錯 ( 掉到300以下, 想接刀子, 此役只 -10%虧損, 事後整個投資信心喪失) 

Oct 2012  3008 大立光  猜對 ( 但抱不住, 當時美國Obama總統大選) 

June 2014  9904寶成    猜對

July 2014  2723 85度C   猜錯

Oct 2014   6166 凌華    猜對(大賺)

July 2015  權證做空台股  猜對 ( 大賺)

Dec 2015   權證做空台股    猜對 ( 小賺)

June 2016  權證做空台股  猜錯 ( 大賠 70%)

Sept 2016    同時做多(空)美股  不賺不賠

Nov 2016   做多美股     猜對

決策超過 5 小時？小心專案成功率只剩 18％

能夠在一小時以內迅速做出決策的專案，成功率高達58％（而且是在預算之內準時完成）。但要是決策耗時超過五個小時，成功率就會大幅下降到只剩18％

https://www.managertoday.com.tw/books/view/59830?utm_source=likr&utm_medium=likr&utm_campaign=59830

US economy forecast at end Mar 2020

Dear Bobby ~ 

Recently I subsequently explore on US market, also talk with a few investors who are both good at US economy observations. There are some points summarised as follow :

1. Last time we mentioned IHS Markit US Services Feb PMI sharply down 4% with the forecast. But leading index for manufactured sector Chicago PMI of Jan-Feb-Mar show as 42-49- 47.8. Unfinished orders soar and business inventory have been in minus since last Nov. It seems that business inventory is on closeout ( or clearance). and if US consumption can keep going, It'll create persistent demand for industrial production. Another sign to back up view is that  Capacity Utilization in Manufacturer increased to 77 percent in February from 76.60 percent in January