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2026年7月9日 星期四

海龜7號 - Vistra Corp 發電廠估值 (VST) 核電題材






美國電力公用事業(Utilities,尤其是「發電+批發市場」與「競爭性零售電」這一支)的產業前景,正在從過去十多年的「低成長、穩定配息」敘事,轉向更偏「結構性需求上修、供給受限、價格與現金流再定價」的循環。Vistra(VST)主戰場的 ERCOT(德州)PJM(中大西洋/中西部)正好是這波變化最集中的區域。

1) 需求面:AI 資料中心讓「用電成長」回來了,而且集中在特定電網

過去美國用電量長期偏平,但 2025–2026 起明顯轉強,核心驅動來自:

  • AI/雲端資料中心(hyperscalers)
  • 加密貨幣礦場
  • 製造業回流與工業電氣化
  • 交通/供暖電氣化(EV、熱泵)

在區域上,需求不是平均分配,而是高度集中在資料中心聚落與產業帶,最典型就是 ERCOT 與 PJM:

  • 公開的短期展望預期:美國整體零售售電量 2025、2026 年年增各約 2.2%(明顯高於 2020–2024 的約 0.8%均值),其中 德州與中大西洋增速更快
  • 以電網營運區看,市場常見的區域負載成長假設是:ERCOT 長期 5–6% 左右、PJM 約 2–3%(Vistra 管理層也多次以此作為較「務實」的基線),但也存在更激進、波動更大的短期預測(因為資料中心/礦場實際上線時間不確定)。

這代表產業的第一個結論是:電力需求的「趨勢成長率」上修了,而且最先受惠的是在負載熱區有可調度電源的業者。

2) 供給面:新增供給比想像慢,讓備轉與容量變得更值錢

即使用電成長確立,電力供給端的擴張仍面臨多重瓶頸:

  • 新電廠(尤其燃氣)面臨渦輪供應鏈、工程人力、許可與併網排隊
  • 再生能源需要併網與輸配電擴建;且發電型態間歇,仍需要可調度電源搭配
  • 核能新建幾乎不可能快速落地,既有核能延役/增功率(uprate)成為更可行選項
  • 輸電建設周期長,使「電源在對的地方」變得更重要(同樣是發電量,地點會決定價值)

因此產業第二個結論是:在負載快速成長、供給與電網擴建跟不上的情境下,電價/容量價值與尖峰時段的波動性容易上升;擁有「可調度(dispatchable)」與「靠近負載中心」資產者,議價能力更強。

3) 市場結構:PPA/長約正在把電力業「金融化」與「合約化」

AI 客戶為了確保電力可用性與零碳敘事,正在用更積極的方式鎖定供電:

  • 以長期 PPA(20 年等長約)把電力與容量合約化
  • 偏好核能(零碳、容量因子高)與燃氣(可調度、能快速支援上線)

對產業來說,這帶來兩個影響:

  • 現金流能見度上升:從「看現貨電價」轉為「看合約價格+交付條款」
  • 估值框架改變:更多投資人會把這類資產視為「類基礎建設/長久期合約現金流」,而不是單純的景氣循環股

在 Vistra 的案例,市場特別關注它把核能與大型科技客戶簽長約(頁面內容提到與 AWS、Meta 的核能長約容量合計約 3.8GW),本質上就是把「原本受批發價波動」的一部分收益,改造成「長期合約現金流」。

4) 中期(2026–2027)與後段(2027–2028+)的差別:對沖會讓獲利延後反映

競爭性發電商常用避險/對沖鎖定未來售電價格。這在上行周期會出現一個典型現象:

  • 短期財報不一定完整反映電價上行的「現貨紅利」
  • 真正的彈性通常在 合約/對沖逐步到期、重新定價時釋放

市場近期常把「更明顯的供需吃緊」時間點放在 2027–2028 左右,原因是負載(資料中心)落地需要時間,而供給與輸電建設更慢;因此產業第三個結論是:這一輪不像短線題材,更像分階段展開的再定價周期

5) 主要風險:不是只有「用電會不會成長」,而是落地節奏與政治/法規

產業前景雖偏正向,但風險集中在幾個可把上行斜率「削平」的因素:

  • 資料中心上線延後:電網許可、變壓器/輸電交期、地方審批,都可能讓需求延後而非消失
  • 天然氣成本與供應鏈:燃氣資產受氣價、運轉效率、排放成本影響
  • 電力市場規則變動:容量市場設計、可靠度規範、州政府/聯邦政策(核能延役、排放、補貼)會改變資產回報
  • 極端天氣與可靠度事件:同時帶來價格紅利與運轉/維修風險,且政治壓力可能在事後導致監管介入

把上面幾點收斂成一句話:公用事業產業正在進入「負載結構性上升+供給/電網受限」的新周期;在 ERCOT、PJM 這類負載熱區,擁有可調度資產、能把收益合約化(長約/PPA)、並能穿越波動管理風險的業者,通常更容易把產業紅利轉成可持續的現金流與估值提升。



有哪些政策或能源趨勢會影響未來美國發電市場的競爭格局?

影響未來美國發電市場競爭格局的「政策/能源趨勢」,可以用一個框架來看:需求端(誰在買電、怎麼買)+供給端(什麼電源能蓋、蓋多快、成本多少)+電網/市場規則(電怎麼送、怎麼結算、怎麼拿到容量/可靠度收入)。下面把最關鍵、最可能改變競爭排序的幾股力量整理出來。

1) 輸電與併網政策:誰能把電送到「負載熱區」誰就更有定價權

  • 輸電擴建與規則改革正在成為整個產業的瓶頸與勝負手。資料中心與大型工業用戶集中在 PJM、ERCOT、MISO/SPP 等區域,但「電網建設+審批+競標/發包流程」往往拖慢專案。
  • 近期可見的方向是:要求加速輸電投資、簡化某些區域輸電專案的程序(例如針對既有規則造成的延宕提出調整訴求),目的就是讓大型負載與新電源更快接上系統。
  • 對競爭格局的含意:
    • 地點優勢上升:靠近負載中心、且已具備可用併網點/輸電容量的既有機組,價值會被重估。
    • 新進者門檻提高:就算發電成本便宜,如果卡在 interconnection queue(併網排隊)或輸電塞車,實際可交付性就打折。

2) 潔淨能源稅賦與供應鏈限制:再生能源「還會蓋」,但誰能蓋得快、合規、拿到稅惠差很多

  • 美國潔淨能源政策在 2025 後出現明顯調整:部分風電/太陽能的稅賦優惠資格窗口縮短、且對供應鏈來源(例如特定國家/受控實體的限制)更嚴格;同時,關稅與貿易調查提高了部分設備成本與不確定性。
  • 產業結果通常是:
    • 短期「搶建潮」:開發商會趕在期限前動工(safe harbor / 開工認定),造成 2026 前後建置節奏更不平均。
    • 規模與供應鏈能力變成護城河:能鎖定設備、能處理合規文件、能取得融資與稅權益變現的業者,案源更容易活下來。
  • 對發電競爭格局的含意:
    • 再生能源的邊際發電成本雖低,但若建置變慢或成本上升,會讓可調度電源(天然氣、核能、儲能)在可靠度與尖峰供電上的競爭力上升。
    • 能提供「24/7 可用」或「可合約化交付」的電源更容易拿到大型客戶長約。

3) EPA 碳排/環境規範的走向:決定煤電退場速度、也決定燃氣新機組的合規成本

  • 電力部門的溫室氣體與污染物管制(例如針對化石燃料電廠的 CO2 規範)若趨嚴,通常會帶來兩件事:
    1) 煤電更快退或降低運轉時數(供給收縮)
    2) 燃氣新機組需要面對更高的合規/改造成本與不確定性(供給擴張變慢)
  • 反之,若規範趨鬆,短期可能讓既有化石機組延壽、壓抑電價上行斜率,但在需求仍強的背景下,瓶頸常會轉移到輸電與設備交期。
  • 對競爭格局的含意:政策不只影響「總供給」,更影響「哪種電源的邊際成本/風險溢酬」;而這會直接改變發電商的資產組合優勢。

4) 容量市場/可靠度機制改革:誰能提供「可用容量」誰就多一條獲利曲線

  • 在 PJM 這類有容量市場的區域,當供需轉緊、可靠度被政治與監管放大,容量付款與可靠度產品常會變得更重要。
  • 在 ERCOT 這類能量市場為主、但逐步強化可靠度服務設計的區域,市場也可能透過新增的可靠度服務/輔助服務來提高「可調度資源」的報酬。
  • 對競爭格局的含意:
    • 具備 快速啟停、可長時間運轉、燃料供應相對可靠 的資產(高效率燃氣、核能、部分儲能/混合系統)更可能受益。
    • 純靠間歇性資源的玩家,會更依賴儲能、長約或聚合(DER/VPP)來補齊「可用性」敘事。

5) 大型負載(資料中心)採購方式改變:PPA、核能長約、甚至「自備/共址」在重塑市場

  • 趨勢很清楚:大型科技/資料中心不只買電,還在買確定性(交付時間、容量、碳屬性)。因此出現:
    • 更長天期的 PPA(含核能/零碳屬性)
    • 對「橋接電力」(臨時供電、快速上線)需求上升
    • 部分情境走向 on-site / co-located 發電與儲能,避開併網排隊
  • 這會改變競爭規則:不是誰發電最便宜就贏,而是誰能「按時交付、可簽長約、可把風險結構化」就贏。
    • 也因此,擁有核能或可調度燃氣、且能做長約/風險管理的發電商,通常更有談判籌碼(這也是市場近期重新評價部分競爭性發電商的原因)。

6) 儲能與 FERC Order 2222(DER 聚合)等市場開放:削弱尖峰價差、也創造新玩家

  • 儲能成本與市場規則持續演進,讓儲能從早期偏輔助服務,逐步走向能量套利+容量/可靠度多重收入
  • FERC Order 2222 方向是讓分散式資源(家用/商用電池、需求反應、EV 充電等)以「聚合」方式進入批發市場,長期可能:
    • 在局部尖峰時段提供替代供給(壓抑極端電價)
    • 讓零售端/負載管理方案更有競爭力(改變零售電與批發電的分工)
  • 對發電市場競爭格局的含意:尖峰價差若被儲能/需求反應吃掉一部分,純靠「尖峰暴利」的機組估值會更看重它能否拿到容量/合約收入。

把以上因素濃縮成一句最重要的判斷:未來美國發電市場的競爭,會越來越像「可交付的可靠度商品」競賽——政策(稅惠/排放/輸電/市場規則)決定你能不能蓋、蓋在哪、怎麼拿錢;能源趨勢(AI 負載、儲能、長約化)決定客戶願意為什麼付費。這兩者交織,會把優勢集中到「在負載熱區、擁有可調度資產、且能把現貨波動轉成長約現金流」的玩家。



競爭對手與優劣勢

Vistra(VST)的競爭對手要分兩層看:(1) 同樣是「競爭性發電商/IPP(merchant generator)」的直接對手,以及 (2) 傳統「管制型」公用事業(regulated utility)在資料中心/電網投資潮下也變成間接競爭者(搶長約、搶併網、搶資本)。

下面用「主要對手 → 對手強在哪 → VST 相對優劣」的方式整理。


一、直接競爭對手(IPP/競爭性發電商)

1) Constellation Energy(CEG)—「純核能/零碳基載」的最強對照組

  • 對手強項
    • 核能資產規模大、零碳屬性純度高,對 hyperscaler 的 24/7 零碳需求很有吸引力
    • 核能在「可調度+零碳」這個組合上幾乎是稀缺資產,具天然護城河(新核能難建)
  • VST 相對優勢
    • VST 不只核能,還有大量燃氣與零售電整合,能提供「合約化核能+就近燃氣橋接電力」的組合拳,尤其適合負載快速成長但電網/併網卡關的區域
    • 商業模式更像「發電+零售+風控」的綜合平台,現金流來源更分散
  • VST 相對劣勢
    • 市場在談「零碳 premium」時,CEG 的故事更單純,估值敘事通常更有力;VST 因燃氣比重高,ESG 與政策風險敘事較吃虧

2) NRG Energy(NRG)—「零售電+燃氣」的正面交鋒者(尤其德州)

  • 對手強項
    • 同樣有零售電業務與發電資產,且在零售端經營、客戶獲取與產品設計上很強,會在德州等競爭零售市場與 VST 正面競價
    • 擴張燃氣機組/併購讓「可調度電力」供給能力提升,能吃到 AI 負載成長紅利
  • VST 相對優勢
    • VST 具核能平台(含長約/PPA 的能見度提升)+燃氣彈性+零售對沖,對「電價波動」的抗震設計更完整
  • VST 相對劣勢
    • 在零售市場,NRG 的競爭策略可能帶來更激烈的促銷/流失率壓力(零售電不是贏者全拿,容易被價格戰影響毛利)

3) Talen Energy(TLN)—偏「merchant 發電」槓桿更高的同型競品

  • 對手強項
    • 資產組合與區域布局較集中在 PJM 等批發市場,對電價/容量市場上行的彈性可能更大(同時風險也更大)
  • VST 相對優勢
    • VST 有零售電與更分散的資產組合,波動較不那麼極端;加上核能長約提高中長期能見度
  • VST 相對劣勢
    • 當市場進入「純電價/容量大牛市」時,TLN 這類更純的 merchant beta 有時更容易被短期追價

4) Calpine / LS Power 等(未上市或私募色彩濃的燃氣玩家)

  • 對手強項
    • 以高效率燃氣為核心、在 ERCOT/CAISO/PJM 等市場長期深耕,對 spark spread(電價-氣價價差)與調度效率很敏感,營運端競爭力強
  • VST 相對優勢
    • VST 多了「核能+零售對沖+電池儲能」等槓桿,不是只靠燃氣景氣循環
  • VST 相對劣勢
    • 在純燃氣效率/機組可用率競賽上,這些玩家常常是最硬的對手(尤其尖峰供電與快速啟停的營運細節)

二、間接競爭對手(管制型公用事業:搶負載、搶輸電、搶長約)

這一類不是直接在同一個商業模式競爭,但在「資料中心時代」會變成關鍵對手,因為它們控制了輸配電併網節奏,也能透過大型資本支出把成長「鎖進」管制回報。

你頁面中也提到 VST 的重點市場在 ERCOT、PJM;而像 AEP(AEP)、Dominion(D)這類在 PJM/中大西洋與德州有布局的公司,會透過:

  • 擴大輸電/配電投資(把資料中心接進來)
  • 簽大型負載協議、收取基礎設施費用
    來吃到 AI 用電紅利。

VST 的關鍵差異在於:它更像「賣電與容量的競爭型平台」,而管制型公用事業更像「蓋電網、收管制回報」。當輸電成為瓶頸時,管制型公司的地位會上升;當批發市場供需吃緊、電價上行時,VST 這類 merchant 曝險更能放大獲利。


三、Vistra 的核心優勢(為什麼在這輪競局裡討好)

優勢 1:發電+零售電的整合模型(天然避險)

  • VST 不是純 merchant:零售負載可以在一定程度上對沖批發電價波動(發電賺時零售可能承壓;電價跌時零售成本下降),讓現金流更平滑。

優勢 2:「核能長約化」把 merchant 變合約現金流

  • 頁面題材提到核能與資料中心長約(PPA)把收入從「看現貨」轉向「看合約」,這會在估值上帶來能見度溢價,也降低資本市場對波動的折價。

優勢 3:燃氣可調度資產擴張,貼近負載熱區

  • AI/資料中心需要的是「能準時上線的可靠度」,燃氣機組常是橋接電力(bridge power)的現實解;VST 透過併購與擴建(題材提到 Cogentrix、Lotus、Permian 新機組)在缺電熱區加碼,方向正確。

優勢 4:資本配置偏股東回饋

  • 目前頁面內容提到加速回購與股利、信用評等等,代表它在景氣上行期把現金流回饋股東的傾向明確,這在同業中是重要特色。

四、Vistra 的主要劣勢與結構性風險(競爭上會被打到的點)

劣勢 1:市場與政策風險較高(非純管制回報)

  • 競爭性發電商終究會受電價、燃料、容量市場規則與對沖策略影響;相較管制型公用事業,獲利波動與估值波動都更大。

劣勢 2:德州/ERCOT 集中度帶來雙面刃

  • ERCOT 成長快、也容易出現極端天氣/電價事件與政治壓力;一旦市場設計或監管方向改變,對獲利模型的影響會比「分散到多州管制」的同業更直接。

劣勢 3:燃氣比重使長期碳政策不確定性更高

  • 即使短中期燃氣是可靠度必需品,長期若碳排規範趨嚴、或零碳資源(核能、長時儲能、地熱等)商轉加速,燃氣資產的估值折現率可能被拉高。

五、把競爭格局濃縮成一句話

VST 最強的地方是「核能(合約化)+燃氣(可調度)+零售(對沖)+交易/風控能力」的組合拳;最怕的是「政策/市場規則改變導致 merchant 收益被壓縮」以及「零售端價格戰/客戶流失」這兩種從兩端同時夾擊的情境。





Vistra在資產配置或成本結構上有哪些地方是領先或落後主要對手的?

Vistra(VST)在「資產配置」與「成本結構」上的領先/落後,最關鍵要用它的定位來對照:VST 是競爭性發電商(merchant/IPP)+德州零售電(retail)整合;而主要對手大致分成兩類:

  • 同型 IPP(例如 NRG、TLN、CEG 等):比的是機組組合、對沖與交易能力、可交付的可靠度、PPA/長約能力、資本配置效率
  • 管制型/合約型公用事業(例如 NEE 等):比的是資本成本、長約/管制回收的穩定性、可再生與電網投資規模

下面我把「領先」與「落後」拆成可落地的幾個面向。


一、資產配置:VST 哪些地方相對領先?

1) 「核能+燃氣」的組合更貼近 AI 的 24/7 需求(相對偏再生能源的對手更有優勢)

  • 領先點:VST 透過核能資產與大型科技客戶長約(頁面也提到 AWS、Meta 等長天期 PPA)把「零碳基載」合約化,再用燃氣機組提供尖峰/橋接(bridge power)與可調度性。
  • 對照:像 NextEra(NEE)雖然也有穩定的合約/管制現金流與龐大再生能源平台,但再生能源天生間歇,若客戶要的是「不間斷」而且「能很快上線」,能談判的籌碼常會回到核能/燃氣這類可調度資源。

2) 零售電(德州)+發電的整合,讓 VST 的「風險結構」更漂亮

  • 領先點:VST 不只是賣電的機組,還有零售電客戶負載。這讓它在批發電價波動時,有機會形成「自然對沖」:
    • 批發電價飆 → 發電端賺、零售端可能承壓
    • 批發電價跌 → 零售採購成本降、發電端承壓
      對整體現金流的穩定性是加分,這是很多純 merchant 發電商做不到的。
  • 對照:同為零售+發電的 NRG(NRG)也有類似結構,因此 VST 的優勢不是「獨有」,而是看誰的客戶結構、避險與資產調度做得更好。

3) 併購/擴張策略偏向「買現成可用資產+補可調度缺口」

  • 領先點:頁面題材提到燃氣組合擴張(Lotus、Cogentrix、Permian 新機組等),這類策略的共同點是:把可調度容量往負載熱區集中,更能吃到 ERCOT/PJM 供需收斂的紅利。
  • 競爭含意:在輸電與併網排隊成為瓶頸的年代,「既有機組+既有併網點」的價值通常高於紙上談兵的新案場。

二、資產配置:VST 哪些地方相對落後/有結構性包袱?

1) 可再生能源(風光)規模與「資本成本優勢」通常不如 NEE 這種巨型平台

  • 落後點:在大規模、低資金成本、長約化的風光儲開發上,NEE 這種玩家通常更有規模經濟(供應鏈、工程、融資、稅務架構熟練度)。
  • 對 VST 的影響:如果未來競爭主軸變成「誰能最便宜地把大量風光儲塞進電網、並且長約鎖客」,VST 的相對優勢會比較偏向「可靠度」而不是「最低度電成本」。

2) 部分資產仍帶「傳統電力公司包袱」(例如煤電/除役與環境成本議題)

  • 落後點:在目前政策與社會趨勢下,煤電與相關除役/整治/法規成本,會讓成本結構更複雜,也提高折現率(投資人會要求更高風險溢酬)。
  • 對照:若同業是更「乾淨」或更「單純」的資產組合(例如核能純度更高、或管制型資產占比更高),在 ESG 與監管風險敘事上會更吃香。

三、成本結構:VST 哪些地方相對領先?

1) 高比例對沖/合約化讓「可預測成本」提高(降低利潤大起大落)

  • 市場資料常提到 VST 對 2026~2028 發電量有高比例避險/對沖與合約覆蓋,外加核能長約(PPA)提高能見度。
  • 競爭優勢:在燃料(天然氣)與電價都很波動的環境裡,能把現金流的「尾端風險」壓下來,本身就是成本結構上的優勢(資金成本也通常會受益)。

2) 資本配置偏向回購,代表它不一定要用高額、低回報的 CAPEX 去「買成長」

  • 從頁面資訊看,公司回購與股息回饋力度大,這意味著它更傾向把「可分配現金」回到股東,而不是像許多管制型或再生能源巨頭那樣長期高 CAPEX。
  • 競爭含意:當利率偏高、供應鏈/工程成本上升時,「不用硬蓋一堆新案」有時反而是成本結構上的勝利。

四、成本結構:VST 哪些地方相對落後/需要盯?

1) 燃氣資產比重高 → 對天然氣價格與熱效率更敏感

  • 落後點:燃氣機組的變動成本核心是燃料成本與機組效率(heat rate)。即使能把部分風險對沖掉,若長期天然氣成本上移或供應/輸送受限,仍可能影響邊際競爭力。
  • 對照:核能/再生能源的燃料成本波動相對小,成本曲線更穩。

2) 儲能事故/停機會把「運維與保險/整改」成本拉高(短期拖累相對競爭力)

  • 市場資訊曾提到 Moss Landing 儲能設施事故後部分容量停用,這類事件會帶來:
    • 直接的維修/整改與保險成本不確定性
    • 原本預期的套利/輔助服務收入落空
    • 在投標/談合約時被要求更保守的安全條件
  • 競爭含意:對手若沒有類似事件,短期在儲能收益與信用評價上會更有利。

3) 估值與股東權益結構也透露「資本結構比較吃緊」

  • 從最新快照指標看:VST 的 PB 約 17.11 倍,遠高於 NEE 約 3.29 倍、NRG 約 7.08 倍
  • 這通常不是單純「比較貴」,而是代表市場在 VST 身上看到更高的獲利槓桿/波動性、或股東權益基礎較小等特徵,使得 PB 指標看起來偏高。對成本結構的含意是:市場對風險的要求報酬也會更高,資本成本未必能像大型管制型公用事業那樣低。

一句話總結

VST 的領先在於:核能合約化+燃氣可調度+零售負載對沖,讓它在 AI 24/7 用電需求下同時兼具「可靠度」與「現金流可見度」。落後/風險在於:燃氣與競爭性市場曝險使成本更受燃料與市場規則影響,且儲能/傳統資產的運維與事件風險會讓成本結構在特定年份變得比較不穩。





目前價格估出來134.3, 跟今天123不會差很多, 
Operating income我是用中性偏樂觀去估計
高登模型盈餘成長是1%, 假如設成2%, 價格變成210

2025年11月1日 星期六

海龜9號 Paypal

 



PSP 名詞解釋
Our business is subject to complex and changing laws, rules, regulations, policies, licensing schemes, and legal interpretations in the markets in which we offer services directly or through partners, including, but not limited to, those governing: banking, credit, deposit taking, cross-border and domestic money transmission, prepaid access, foreign currency exchange, privacy, data protection, data governance, cybersecurity, banking secrecy, digital payments, cryptocurrency, payment services (including payment processing and settlement services), lending, fraud detection, consumer protection, antitrust and competition, economic and trade sanctions, anti-money laundering, and counter-terrorist financing.


Transaction Margin Dollars (TM$) represents the profit PayPal makes on payment transactions after deducting direct costs, such as transaction losses and processing expenses. This metric is used internally and in public financial statements to measure the profitability of the company's core operation


PayPal spots ‘softer’ consumer spending

The digital payments pioneer pointed to consumers’ smaller purchases in the third quarter, and sees the trend continuing.

“Overall, we have seen relatively consistent growth in the number of checkout transactions, but basket sizes or average order value has decreased,” said Jamie Miller, who is the company’s chief financial and operating officer. “We’ve observed this trend continuing through October.”


2025 Q2 earning call , addressed by Alex :
Moving to our PSP business. I want to reflect on one of my first earnings calls, where we shared our plan to reset our largest merchant relationships to price our services to the value we deliver. The consequence of that reset was pressure on growth in exchange for long-term profitability. Now we are on the other side of that, and can confidently say that our strategy worked. We maintained our customers, and we are having more strategic conversations and relationships with them. And most importantly, we are now growing our Braintree TPV again, and expect an acceleration in the back half of the year. This is an important inflection point, and I am really proud of the team for their execution.


Key to this strategy has been investing in and scaling our strong suite of value-added services. These services are helping position PayPal as a trusted innovative partner in this evolving commerce landscape and have transformed the margin profile of our PSP business.


Let me share one example. Payouts is one of the value-added services that is growing rapidly. Some of the world's top travel, mobility and social commerce platforms already use Hyperwallet to manage and distribute funds to hosts, drivers and creators globally. Most recently, our payouts capabilities were a strategic enabler in our landmark partnerships with the Big 12 and Big Ten college athletic conferences that I mentioned earlier. Hyperwallet enables the conferences to provide student athletes with rapid access to revenue share payments that can be sent directly to their PayPal or Venmo accounts, where they can then spend and send the money instantly. For small businesses, our priority remains empowering merchants with the tools they need to manage and accelerate their growth. We're steadily migrating more transactions on to PayPal Complete Payments. PPCP enables SMBs to easily access our latest online branded checkout and new products like Fastlane. As of today, over half of SMB volume flows through this platform, a notable improvement since last quarter. Our recent expansion of PPCP into Singapore further extends our global reach. We also continue to deepen our relationships with the most popular platforms where SMBs manage and grow their businesses. Just last week, we announced an expanded partnership with Wix, that gives merchants access to our full suite of payment tools, seamlessly integrates into Wix Payments to fuel sales growth. When our small business customers succeed, the relationship with PayPal deepens, and we remain committed to expanding access to the tools and capital that fuel that growth.




While we are pleased with our progress, what's even more exciting is the foundation we are building to sustain and accelerate this growth in the years ahead. TM dollars growth had multiple sources in the quarter, including strong credit performance, branded checkout flow-through, improvements in PSP profitability, and Venmo. We drove operating leverage through a combination of top line growth and cost discipline, as we remix less productive spend into product, tech and marketing.


Turning to PSP, which spans both large enterprise and SMB processing, as well as parts of our vast portfolio like payouts, invoicing, and point-of-sale solutions, volume grew 2%, in line with the first quarter. Our focus on prioritizing healthy, quality growth within our Braintree business continues to deliver meaningful TM dollars improvement.



We are capitalizing on untapped opportunities in PSP and SMB. At the same time, we are actively shaping the future of commerce through our work in AI, ads and crypto. And our velocity of innovation is only accelerating. I am more excited than ever about the future we're building.






2024  Paypal業績觀察,  打臉2年前負面新聞 

Paypal手續營收年成長率

Merchant Checkout TPV

     總成交量

23Q3

23Q4

24Q1

24Q2

      Branded

       透過Paypal交易

+6%

+5%

+7%

+6%

     Unbranded

+32%

+29%

26%

+19%

2024 EPS 預估至少有4塊

2020 當年度是3.54  卻漲到200多塊

Paypal  free cash flow per share 6.4   81 in price as of 11th Oct 2024 


SQ    free cash flow per share 0.88   70 in price as of 11th Oct 2024


Visa  Free Cash Flow per Share 9.27,  250 in price as of 11th Oct 2024

2024年10月10日 星期四

海龜12號 Docusign Inc





Our initial annual guidance expected a lower rate of early renewals in Fiscal 26 as reps increasingly focus on IAM expansion potential. We had anticipated the impact to take place after Q1, but the reduction in early renewals began sooner than forecasted. This resulted in lower-than-expected early renewal billings in Q1. We take responsibility for not fully anticipating the timing of this shift in our guidance.



ServiceTitan, the operating system that powers the trades, and a longtime Docusign customer, is deploying IAM across legal, HR, sales, and procurement, using Docusign Maestro to create time-saving automated workflows and Docusign Navigator to gain greater insight into its business. As part of our growing strategic go-to-market partnership with Microsoft, we’re delivering this IAM solution via the Azure Marketplace.

Within our go-to-market pillar, we continue to drive transformation across three integrated routes now all selling IAM: direct, self-serve, and partner. 


Robbie David Owens

Okay. Perfect. And then our understanding as we lean in a little more aggressively this year, which didn't come to fruition in the first quarter. And I understand the commentary around the timing of some of the cloud migration efforts. Anything else at play? And you did talk about increasing sales capacity without expanding the team. Is that something that you're factoring into the calculus here or something that could lend to upside just in terms of repurposing a lot of that existing sales force?

Allan C. Thygesen

We're not counting on that, but I certainly hope so that over time, that sales capacity will translate into more bookings and billings and revenue. Maybe just -- let me just touch quickly on some of the changes that we made at the beginning of the year to set ourselves up for long-term success. We -- besides the early renewals piece, which really was a minor element of the changes that we made, big changes were we really wanted our sales reps to be able to focus more time to go deeper and sell more broadly into organizations that represented the biggest growth opportunity.

And so we resegmented and changed the portfolios for our sellers and moved a substantial number of customers to a self-serve first model. And so that freed up capacity in effect without additional headcount to let our reps go deeper. We also changed our sales compensation model to emphasize more annualized models and emphasize IAM and so on. And so there were a lot of levers pulled to set ourselves up for, shall we say, a larger deal, more enterprise type of sales motion. That will be a long journey for the company. And -- but we've begun it. I'm very pleased with the early results and how the sales teams are responding to that. And we're feeling like that those were the right changes to make to set us up to really capture the full potential of IAM.



The dollar net retention rate increased slightly to 101%, in line with Q4 and up from 99% in Q1 of 2025. We continue to expect dollar net retention to moderately improve throughout the year based on both gross retention improvement and IAM upsell impact. IAM sales continued to show strong momentum with both IAM deal volume and revenue slightly outpacing our expectations this quarter. IAM's share of total direct deal volume, including upsell deals and new customer deals, increased meaningfully quarter-over-quarter



Joshua Phillip Baer

I was hoping you could provide some context for how much of the double-digit percentage that will be IAM as a percentage of subscription book of business is coming from upsell and net new customers versus that transition from eSignature. Just any context for how accretive or incremental IAM is on the business?


Blake Jeffrey Grayson
Sure. So we're not disclosing expansion rates like that. Obviously, with the book of business that we have with the size of it, $3 billion plus, we have a huge opportunity to be able to provide extra value to our existing customers. So I think that existing installed base, and that is an upsell from what they're doing today because if you recall, the vast, vast majority of the IAM deals that we're doing are expansions of spend because we're providing additional value to customers. But also, we're finding that new customers also are quite interested in it. And it's becoming a much, much larger share of our new deals, our new company deals that we're doing. So it's going to come from both of these things, but I think that it's fair to assume that with the size of the installed base that we currently have, the biggest opportunity we have is with customers that we already do business with.



向上銷售(Up-Selling)是什麼?有什麼用?

向上銷售(Up-Selling)是指在銷售過程中,銷售人員引導顧客購買比原先預計購買產品更高級別、更昂貴或利潤更高的產品或服務。這種銷售技巧的目的是增加每筆交易的銷售額,從而提高整體的利潤,能從多方面達到業績提升效果:

  1. 增加平均交易價值:通過鼓勵顧客購買更高價值的商品,可以提高每次購買的平均銷售額。
  2. 提高顧客滿意度:如果更高級別的產品能夠更好地滿足顧客的需求,這可能會提高他們對購買的滿意度,進而提升顧客忠誠度。
  3. 促進庫存周轉:向上銷售有助於推動更高價位或高利潤產品的銷售,這可以有效管理庫存並促進庫存周轉。
  4. 實現銷售目標:對銷售團隊來說,通過向上銷售可以更快地達到銷售目標和提成目標。
  5. 提高競爭力:向上銷售可以幫助企業更好地利用其產品線的多樣性,從而與競爭對手相比獲得優勢。
實施向上銷售時,應始終考慮顧客的最佳利益,並且要確保所推薦的產品真正能夠帶來額外的價值,而不是單純為了提高銷售額。如果向上銷售僅僅基於公司的利益,而忽視了顧客需求,則可能損害顧客關係,適得其反。








Docusign    free cash flow per share 4.39    price 69.5 in price as of 11th Oct 2024 

Counterstrike   free cash flow per share 4.43   314.9 in price as of 11th Oct 2024 


https://www.reddit.com/r/LawFirm/comments/149fy8k/is_adobe_esign_sufficient_adobe_esign_vs_docusign/

https://www.docusign.com/vs/docusign-vs-adobe-sign

https://www.gartner.com/reviews/market/electronic-signature/vendor/docusign/product/docusign-esignature/alternatives


DOCU 目前有個最大問題是Standard以及 pro 方案價格將近 Adobe e-signature 兩倍, 會逐漸失去一般客群, 但在高端使用

( 法院証明, 破產清算, 遺產處置) 仍有相當價值


Acrobat Standard costs $12.99 per month per license 

Docusign Standard plans start at $25 per user per month

Acrobat Pro costs $19.99 per month per license.

Docusign  $40 for Business Pro






Anyone using Adobe for e-sign? Have you gotten any pushback? (e.g. opposing counsel, state agencies, or insurance carriers refusing to accept your client's signature)

Currently have Adobe e-sign and Docusign subscriptions. Would like to cancel Docusign since I use Adobe regularly and it has an integrated e-sign feature.

Docusign seems more "legit" because it adds an envelope ID at the top left of every page, a date under each signature, and provides a receipt. Adobe does not seem to have any of these features.






Im in a matter now in which the defendant in a breach of contract matter swapped a page in a contract that had a wet signature. I’m the plaintiff who also happens to be a lawyer. I traced the metadata. Clear and convincing evidence he produced a fraudulent contract. Now he’s being reported to local authorities and
 the FBI for extortion using interstate commerce. So yea- stick to e-signatures to avoid this sort of problem.



Because a hand-signed document can easily be altered, have pages substituted in, or be outright fabricated much easier than a document signed in Docusign or Adobe.


I’m old and always get wet signatures other than fee agreements.

My colleague had a client create a fake email for her spouse so she could sign for her husband. She filed bankruptcy for both of them and he didn’t know until trustee contacted him. Shit hit the fan


I worry about this. At least locally we have a pre-filing meeting rule for attorneys. Trustee asks debtors if they met with their attorney before filing at the 341.

All of our AdobeSign signatures get a date automatically added underneath, but this might be an enterprise setting by the administrator.

I prefer Docusign over AdobeSign, but our company only has Adobe, and the only people who ever complain about it are in countries that either don't accept e-signatures (fair) or distrust e-signatures even though they're legal (annoying).




FWIW, unless you're using DocuSign's advanced features like remote online notary (which I believe other services are starting to offer), contract lifecycle management, templates, or workflows, you're better off with Adobe e-sign. You'll still get the audit trail and other indicia that you would need if the e-signature is challenged in court, and that is the most important thing.


I use Adobe Sign as close to exclusively as I can in my Bankruptcy practice.


Adobe Sign, for the past 5 years, no issues, with either opposing or the court (if you don’t count the bar section meeting discussion that resulted in the practice of supplying the audit trail.)

Until yesterday, when a client (who is an IT security pro) said he didn’t want “sensitive” documents provided to him by any means except our secure portal.






Here are a few things to consider when comparing Adobe eSign to Docusign:

Legality - Both are legally recognized forms of electronic signature under the ESIGN and UETA laws. So from a pure legality standpoint, either should be acceptable.


Industry adoption - Docusign has a larger market share and is likely more familiar/trusted by others you exchange documents with. Adobe eSign may be unknown or questioned more.


Signature security - Both use secure digital signature technology so the signatures themselves are equally valid. Docusign adds some cosmetic elements like envelope ID and date stamps that make it look more like a "traditional" signed document.


Features - Docusign generally has more specialized e-signature focused features like built-in analytics, reminders/notifications, vault storage, pre-fill forms, etc. Adobe eSign is more basic.


Compatibility - Docusign integrates more seamlessly with other legal/office tools like CRM, billing, contracts management systems through their partner ecosystem.

So in summary, while both are legally valid options, Docusign may be less likely to raise questions or objections from others due to its stronger industry presence and reputation as the leader in e-signatures specifically. The extra features and integration options are also a plus. Unless you have a specific price or workflow reason to stay with Adobe eSign, most experts would recommend Docusign for legal use cases. But Adobe could work too if needed.