Nov 2021
合晶接到長期合約, 有什麼管道獲知一家企業與客戶簽屬銷貨屬於短期(或長期)合約 ??
從財報上或者法說會 ?
2021年12月29日 星期三
產業上下游 - 供需分析
Dec . 2021
昨天美股半導體股裏面漲幅第一的是奇景光電，這家公司其實是做驅動IC的台灣IC設計公司，只是沒有在台灣上市罷了，規模比聯詠小一些，因爲今年驅動IC行情不錯，成爲了全世界第十大IC設計公司。其實驅動IC股最近漲勢也是不錯。驅動IC是技術門檻不高，但量很大的IC，晶圓代工厰過去都是用他們來填充產能，一旦產能緊俏，他們就會優先被其他更重要的產業所替代，今年車用IC就擠掉了不少驅動IC的產能，這對驅動IC厰就產生很好的漲價理由，漲價效應一出來，股價就起飛了，天鈺去年每股獲利才4.07元，但今年前三季就賺了26.26元，股價最高漲到395元
最近聽到廣達林百里說：整體缺料狀況將逐步改善，但不是在某一個時間點就改善，而是由供需雙方【媒合】所致(市場價格機制)，所謂媒合就是需求方要很努力的找料源，供給方藉由調漲價格把重複下單的需求擠掉
廣達林百里也說明年的訂單多很多，客戶下單時間已經拉長到兩年(做筆電, 伺服器)，訂單多很多表示不是沒有需求，下長單也是確保供貨。訂單很多就增加了很多IC的需求，也就是增加了很多晶圓代工的產能需求。林百里也用【有驚無險，步步高升】形容今年的運營，確實廣達在今年11月收1132億創下歷史新高
2021年12月16日 星期四
海龜51號 - 2379 瑞昱
2021Q1法說會
整個產出受限於產業產能影響, 今年淡旺季效應不會很明顯
已提到對2.5G Eithernet交換器需求要到2022才正式放大
供應鏈(吃緊)問題可能2021下半年仍無法解決, 甚至延展到2022上半
晶圓漲價
營業收入 PC: 非PC產品占比 34:66
WiFi 6 價格是否為WiFi 5的2倍
AC是一個相對比較成熟產品
車用乙太網路, 至2024年有50%以上車子將使用車用乙太網路
每部車子加裝約40個乙太網路port
PC 產品 Gigabite IP Cam監控產品
2021Q3 法說會
2021下半年消費性電子產品是有放緩趨勢( 電視 - Chrome book - IOT產品 )
但是商用市場仍然非強強勢, 比如商用需求, 商用PC, 網通需求, 車用PC
產業狀況供給仍明顯小於需求, 下游庫存有上升, 來自於下游公司都極大化其產能, 極大化需求
市場機會WiFi 6, 2.5G Eithernet
供應鏈供給短缺的確延緩瑞昱客戶設備規格Upgrade速度, 但這幾個規格他們升級需求是非常明確, 在2022年規格升級, 可預見滲透到各個網路應用中
WiFi 6和 WiFi 6.1會逐漸取代WiFi 4代5代
WiFi 6在PC市場和路由器市占從2021年20-30%上升到2022年50-60%
高階競爭對手 高通, 聯發科 中低階對手來自大陸本土某些廠商
WiFi 專注市場與定價策略 , 如何與競爭對手做到市場差異化 2021Q3法說影片 25:00
價格ASP部分 11N, wifi4, wifi5, AF6 他們在市場是共存 價格比例 1:3:4.5
wifi6.1 價格再往上調20%
網路路由器, Gateway器從2020年底因為供應鏈問題造成市場溫度無法有效上升, 但確定一點到2022年這方面產品需求仍不會衰退
WiFi 6 -交換器 -車用- 藍芽 在2022年市有很大成長空間
2021年12月5日 星期日
Amazon web 物價調查
Bose QuietComfort Noise Cancelling Earbuds - Bluetooth Wireless Earphones, Triple Black, the World's Most Effective Noise Cancelling Earbuds
Dec 2021 $198.9
Fitbit Sense Advanced Smartwatch with Tools for Heart Health, Stress Management & Skin Temperature Trends, Carbon/Graphite, One Size (S & L Bands Included)
Dec 2021 $ (199.95 / Count)
SAMSUNG 32-Inch Class QLED Q60A Series - 4K UHD Dual LED Quantum HDR Smart TV with Alexa Built-in (QN32Q60AAFXZA, 2021 Model)
Dec 2021 $497.99
RCA 32-inch Flat Screen 720p Roku Smart LED TV - RTR3261, 2021 Model
Dec 2021 $ 199.9
3 Pairs Reusable Household Cleaning Gloves with Flock Liner - Waterproof Household Gloves for Laundry, Dishwashing, Gardening
Dec 2021 $ 10.99
Cottonelle FreshFeel Flushable Wet Wipes for Adults and Kids, 8 Flip-Top Packs, 42 Wipes per Pack (336 Wipes Total)
Dec 2021 $ 29.8
O-Cedar EasyWring Microfiber Spin Mop & Bucket Floor Cleaning System + 2 Extra Refills, Red/Gray
Dec 2021 $56.65
2021年11月17日 星期三
2022金融股和大宗商品
When the economy strengthens as it did from 2009 to 2011 investors know that the companies making the most money are those taking advantage of faster economic growth and these companies are those in the commodity-sensitive sector, not the financial stocks. This preference is reflected by declining strength of the financial stocks when the economy improves more rapidly. The other reason the financial sector is weak when the economy grows faster following a period of slow growth or recession is because loan demand is weak during such times
When the economy starts slowing down, as it happened in the beginning of 2011, the commodity-sensitive stock sector performs more poorly (their relative strength declines) and money flows into sectors with superior opportunities. The financial sector is one of these sectors (see Fig. 4.4) as loan demand grows more rapidly because of the growing economy. The outcome is the relative strength of XLF rises when the economy slows down. This pattern is exactly the opposite of the pattern displayed by the materials and energy sectors.
2021年11月6日 星期六
才剛上完老謝節目 光洋科董座火速遭撤職
光洋科（1785）董事長馬堅勇意外遭到撤職，5日光洋科董事會決議，由玉璟有限公司法人代表王炯棻，接任光洋科董事長一職。
王炯棻也是榮剛材料科技（5009）及台灣鋼鐵的董事長。光洋科表示，期許新任董事長導正公司常規，落實公司治理，安定並凝聚員工同仁之向心力。
光洋科認為馬堅勇不適任原由為，馬堅勇未經董事會決議即私自同意延展新創環保科技公司之不動產買賣契約解約期限，且未向簽證會計師揭露前情，刻意欺瞞簽證會計師，毫無公司治理、法治觀念及誠信。
此舉不但違反光洋科公司核決程序，更造成光洋科公司無法解除買賣契約、無法沒收新創環保公司已付買賣價款及無法享有收回不動產之增值利益。
在光洋科110年第二、三季財報，有關新創環保公司之不動產買賣契約揭露事宜，也出現嚴重與買賣契約約定相左，明顯有虛偽隱匿。
上週馬堅勇才上謝金河的電視節目宣傳光洋科營運狀況，本周卻火速遭到撤換，跌破眾人眼鏡。外界猜測，本次先行撤換董事長，應是台鋼集團為了明年改選董監事提前布局。
2021年11月5日 星期五
The economic threats from China’s real estate bubble
My investment idea have been resonated with an article written by Martin Wolf, this guy of Economics sphere is a big one, please read and store as follows
From the macroeconomic point of view, the most important fact
about the Chinese economy is its extraordinary savings. In 2010, gross national
savings reached 50 per cent of gross domestic product. Since then, it has
fallen a little. But it was still 44 per cent of GDP in 2019. While household
savings are extremely high, averaging 38 per cent of disposable incomes between
2010 and 2019, they account for slightly less than half of all these savings.
The rest consist mainly of corporate retained earnings. Investment plus net
exports have to match savings when the economy is operating close to potential
output, if it is not to fall into a slump. Since the global financial crisis, net exports have been a small share of
GDP: the world would not accept any more. Total fixed investment duly
averaged about 43 per cent of GDP from 2010 to 2019. Surprisingly, this was 5
percentage points higher than between 2000 and 2010. Meanwhile, growth fell
significantly. This combination of higher investment with lower growth indicates a
big fall in the returns on investment
Yet there are even bigger problems than
this suggests. One is that the high investment is
associated with huge increases in debt, especially of households and the
non-financial corporate sector: the former jumped from 26 to 61 % of GDP
between the first quarters of 2010 and 2021 and the latter from 118 to 159 %.
Another is that a substantial part of this investment has been wasted. Xi
Jinping himself has spoken of the need to shift “to pursuing genuine rather than
inflated GDP growth”. This has to be a big part of what he meant. This
combination of high and unproductive investment with soaring debt is closely
related to the size and rapid growth of the property sector. A 2020 paper by
Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang argues that china's property sector contributed 29 % of GDP in 2016. Among high-income economies,
only pre-2009 Spain matched this level. Moreover, almost 80 percent of this
impact came from investment, while about a third of China’s exceptionally high
investment has been in property
A number of powerful indicators show that this investment is driven by unsustainable prices and excessive leverage, and is also creating huge excess capacity: the price to income ratios in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are far higher than in other big cities around the world; housing wealth accounted for 78 per cent of all Chinese assets in 2017, against 35 per cent in the US; household debt ratios are comparable with those in high-income countries; vacancy rates and other measures of excess capacity are high; and rates of home ownership had reached 93 per cent in 2017. Furthermore, family formation is slowing, China’s population is aging and 60 % of it is already urbanised. All these signal that the property boom must end.
Since the
government controls the Chinese financial system, it can prevent a financial
crisis. A large fall in house prices and a big negative
impact on household wealth and spending are likely, but might be
avoided. The likeliest threat is that investment in
property will collapse. This would have a large negative effect on local
government finances. But, above all, it would leave a huge hole in
demand. Rogoff and Yang argue that “a 20 % fall in real estate activity could
lead to a 5-10 per cent fall in GDP, even without amplification from a banking
crisis, or accounting for the importance of real estate as collateral.” It
could be worse.
Between 2012 and 2019,
investment contributed 40% of China’s growth in demand. If investment in
property fell sharply, it would leave a huge shortfall. Yet tolerating this
painful adjustment would ultimately be desirable.
It should improve the welfare of the population: after all, building unneeded
properties is a waste of resources. Slowing the
recent pace of property investment would also be a natural consequence of the
“three red lines” for property developers imposed by the state last year: hard
limits on a company’s debt-to-asset ratio, its debt-to-equity ratio and its
cash-to-short-term-debt ratio. The main policy
now should be to shift spending towards consumption, and away from the most
wasteful investment. This would require redistribution of income towards
households, especially poorer households, as well as a rise in public
consumption. Such a shift would also fit with the recent attack on
the privileges of great wealth. It would also require big reforms, notably in
taxation and the structure of public spending. In addition, investors should be
shifted away from property toward the transition away from high carbon
emissions. That too would require big policy changes.
Crises are also opportunities. The Chinese government is well aware that the great investment boom in property has gone far beyond reasonable limits. The economy needs different drivers of demand. Since the country is still relatively poor, a prolonged economic slowdown, such as Japan’s, is unnecessary, especially when one considers the room for improved quality of growth. But the model based on wasteful investment has reached its end. It must be replaced
2021年10月26日 星期二
選擇權- Cover call + protection put
看到有些版友這一兩星期跌的慘兮兮，這邊分享一個低成本的簡單避險方式，讓你的股票即使跌到0也可以用指定價格賣出，用我的FB舉例說明如下。
我的FB平均成本在$168，4/9當時FB在177左右：
1.為了避險我買了一個Put的選擇權，合約價格在175，同時必須支付每股6.2美元的費用(一個合約就要620美元)
但，
我並不想支付這個620美元。
2.所以同時間我又賣了一個Call的選擇權，合約價格在180，這讓我可以賺進640美元
一進一出之下，不但不用支付620，我還倒賺20美元的小毛利。
-
接下來根據FB的造化，有不同的情況發生：
•上漲超過180，FB後來又衝上195，按這趨勢一路上去到我的合約5/17到期時，假設我什麼都不做，我就必須以180強制性賣出(但我平均成本為168，還是有小賺，換句話說，持有成本越低越好)
•下跌超過175，接近到期日時，FB在185，避險作用並沒有發生，但因為我傾向持有並不想賣出，所以又把這兩個positon到期日延長到6/21(Roll out)，看看FB會不會跌
時至今日FB已經跌到168，如果6/21到期日前再往下跌個10塊到158或更低我就會執行(exercise)我在put的合約權利以175賣出(然後再立即以當時市價158買入=>我有賺到+持有成本更低)。
•如果到期時價格落在175-180間，那什麼事也不會發生(除了小賺20塊之外)，合約結束，我還是繼續持有，並開新的合約繼續sell call來賺取額外的premium / 降低FB持有成本。
注意：
• 一個合約為100股，如果你手上不足100股沒辦法這樣做
• 另外股票也可能暴漲個100-200%，如果你認為你的股票有此潛力，就不適合這樣做
• 版友也說到持有成本越低才有操作空間，謝謝版友提醒
2021年10月25日 星期一
A triple shock slows China’s growth ( 附幾張圖, 看看中國內地- 青海省 )
大家都在唱衰中國, 但過去20年他們進步很多
以前講到中國青海省, 大家想到什麼, 地產不豐, 環境氣候惡劣
問年輕人考上大學, 假如學校在青海省, 想不想去念啊 ~
Coal shortages, covid-19 and a construction
slowdown all take their toll
In a scene from
“Manufactured Landscapes”, a documentary released in 2006, Edward Burtynsky, a
landscape photographer, seeks permission to take pictures of the black
mountains of Chinese coal awaiting shipment in Tianjin, an industrial city near
Beijing. “Through his camera lens, through his eyes, it will appear beautiful,”
Mr Burtynsky’s assistant assures his sceptical host. That turns out to be not
quite true. Through the photographer’s lens, the piles of coal have a dark,
satanic geometry—not beautiful exactly, but awe-inspiring in their immensity.
It is hard to imagine China could ever
run shortage of this fuel. But in recent months, the black pyramids(金字塔) have been not
quite immense enough. A scarcity of coal, which accounts for almost two-thirds
of China’s electricity generation, has contributed to the worst power cuts in a
decade. And the blackouts have, in turn, hurt growth. “Our economy is
developing very fast,” Mr Burtynsky’s host tells him, so as to excuse the gloom
and dirt in the air. But that is not quite true any more either.
2021年10月24日 星期日
黃國華 - 一位交易員的政客型老闆 ( 下)
以下故事轉載自財經部落格 『總幹事耕讀筆記』, 作者黃國華是台灣2000s 時期, 一位法人背景出身的投資客, 專長總經研判, 財務分析
文章原文 :
1998年2月17日- 一天搭三趟飛機
那天有幾件特別的事情，一是我和幾位主管要赴高雄去開那一個月一次的主管與董事會。二是我的老闆當天要和他所屬的政黨商議並爭取議員的提名。對了，前一天的2月16日晚上發生了華航大園空難，連當時的央行總裁許遠東也不幸罹難。
看了整個晚上的空難新聞，第二天一早八點我和十來位同事在松山機場搭機飛抵高雄，一行人不到十點鐘便提前來到高雄總公司，董事長秘書匆匆通知，董事長和某黨政高層還在某某地點開會，無法趕回來，會議延後一週召開，於是一大群人又搭了11點的飛機飛回台北，12點飛抵台北，手機剛剛開機，就接到董事長秘書的來電，董事長終於和那位很高很高的黨政高層開完會，下午2點可以進董事長辦公室，所以緊急電召我們其中五位一級主管再飛回高雄開會。
沒辦法！我與其他四位一級主管在機場草草吃個午餐，立刻又搭上12點半的飛機飛到高雄，2點以前終於還是趕上會議，董事長蠻上道的，他也知道自己延宕的開會時程也耽誤了大家的時間，更重要的是，晚上他要參加輔選餐會，於是會議不到50分鐘就草草了事，沒有討論到任何相關業務，不過，這種沒有效率的會議在各行各業相當常見，一旦當上高階主管之後，就得面對這種開不完又沒結果的會議。
一行人來到小港機場，突然發現天氣由小雨轉為雷陣雨，一天之內搭了三趟飛機加上前一天晚上的空難新聞畫面，我不知道其他同事的狀況為何，一登機後，我的胃似乎感到一陣翻滾，陣陣的絞痛加上一股嘔心感覺湧現出來，腦中不斷浮出空難現場的屍塊畫面，一陣小小的亂流都會引起墜機的恐慌，就這樣忍到台北，飛機落底之後才恢復過來。
走出空橋打開手機正想和辦公室的其他交易員連絡一下今天買賣狀況和市場行情，沒想到手機又響起來了，這次不是董事長秘書打來，而是董事長親自打電話給我，要我無論如何要再跑高雄一趟，有重要的業務要交待我，因為剛剛開完會後，他忘記留我下來。
我宛轉的回答他：「可不可以在電話中交待就好了。」
他狠狠地在電話的那一頭吼叫著：「黃協理！今天你不下來高雄，明天你就不用來上班了！」
我默默地搭上晚上6點半的飛機三度飛到高雄，在飛機上我終於吐了！
8點多我趕到高雄總公司，董事長室燈火通明，一群屬於他心腹的主管都現身其中，原來老闆的所謂重要業務是要逼我選邊站；那家公司因為股權分佈而分成兩大派系，一是董事長派，另一派是總經理派，兩邊為了爭奪決策主導權而鬥得不可開交，屬於董事長派的部門，其人事、業務與各項公務的公文完全不經過總經理，相對的，屬於總經派的部門，所有的運作也幾乎不向董事長報備，最嚴重的時候，竟然有兩個會計部門，宛如民國初年的寧漢分裂搞出兩個黨中央的混亂局面；我是總經理從銀行挖角過去的主管，不知不覺地自然就被歸為總經理派。
董事長拿出我所擬定的獎金辦法，用獎金辦法的通過與否來威脅利誘我，要我倒戈到董事長派系中，因為當時我身兼多個部門的主管，董事長打的算盤是，一旦我轄下的部門直接聽命於董事長，那幾乎就把總經理架空了一半以上。為了獎金我只好與他虛與委蛇。
一個券商的操盤大將被迫在天空飛來飛去，我無法靜下心來思考公司的投資部位，經常性的被老闆呼來喚去以致於無法專心在盤面之上👻👻，這也造就了我日後的投資風格：「不看盤」，老闆是政客有諸多缺點，然而在他底下作事的那幾年，年紀輕輕的我就學會了在夾縫中生存的本事，無形中也培養出日後的投資素養，也正是因為那樣的老闆，讓我很早就對資本家的期待有所醒悟。
若年輕一輩的朋友問我：「可不可以選擇政客當自己老闆？」
我不知道。我只記得好幾年後才克服了飛行恐懼症。
對了！那天第二次要從台北飛到高雄的登機前，我獲悉了央行總裁將由彭淮南接任，當時的我下了一個賭注，因為前總裁許遠東是出了名的「貨幣控制者」，換別人幹總裁，貨幣政策只會更寬鬆不會更緊，於是我在松山機場撥了電話給部門的債券交易員進場掃貨，那年，我的部門盈餘幾乎是來自於那筆交易。
黃國華 - 一位交易員的政客型老闆 ( 上)
以下故事轉載自財經部落格 『總幹事耕讀筆記』, 作者黃國華是台灣2000s 時期, 一位法人背景出身的投資客, 專長總經研判, 財務分析
文章原文 :
四十三歲就要寫回憶錄了嗎？未免太早了，不過若藉著回顧一些過往在金融世界的喜怒哀樂與經歷，當成人生下半場的教訓重新出發，不也是一種必經之道。
看過了太多金融人的醜樣，譬如為了多要個幾十張新上市的股票，半夜跑去上市公司老闆家裡去威脅利誘。還有為了讓自己投資的房地產可以順利解套，銀行高層與代書勾結找假人頭假買賣真超貸的。也看過消費金融業務的高層每半年就攆走一批高業積理專，然後把他們的業績通通算在自己或親信底下的。也看過一堆檢察官與法官和銀行高層配合炒作房地產與股市的。也經歷過金融業的派系惡鬥下，藉故將敵對派系的幹部移送法辦的。也看過基金經理人與市場派勾結，直接用基金的資金替外圍抬轎與出貨。也看過專業財經媒體將她的主筆室用議價的方式讓市場派人士去撰寫。也看過財經記者出售她的版面給公司派或作手的。
年少的時候，我並沒有認為那些事情是錯的，甚至還以為金融市場就得那樣運作，甚至於還羨慕起那些人士，然而當我漸漸爬上可以幹些事兒的高階位置的那一刻開始，自己卻膽怯起來，之所以膽怯並非自身的道德感，從學校到金融職場，道德從來不是師長與主管所要求與教導的，從小到大，師長、主管與老闆所要求的是「競爭」、「成長」、「開放」與「獲利」，真正讓我膽怯的是自己的宿命論，因為我總是認為自己的運氣不是很好，別人胡搞瞎搞又可名利雙收的事情，若到了自己手上肯定會東窗事發👶👶，也就是說自認為沒有那種祖墳冒青煙的運氣，有人殺人放火還可以碰到特赦，有人卻在路邊栽朵野花就被警察用手銬銬到警局兩天兩夜；有人坑殺散戶八九年，不僅沒有被市場唾棄，還被散戶捧為救星，被政府視為股市模範，而我不過是寫點善意文章提醒投資人，就被視為化外之民。
至今，我不認為自己的堅持都是必須的，至少對他人而言，當個業務員不去欺瞞客戶，難道要自己喝西北風？當個投資大師不趁機拉抬出貨，難道當散財童子替非親非故的讀者抬轎嗎？
到了中年才產生無謂的正義感，其實是多餘的，說不定只是自己憤世嫉俗的情緒發洩也說不定，年輕時總覺得天下之事無不可為，只能說明自己還沒有長大。中年後卻因為自己的磋跎而陷入怨天尤人，一個人什麼時候能夠明白自己的力量有限，才真正地接近成熟。
我的最後一位老闆是位政治圈的人士，而且還是位政治家族第二代的子弟，偏偏他又是證券公司的老闆，和許多第二代老闆一樣，他是一個高興起來就胡亂承諾，但是事後卻很容易忘得一乾二淨，很多公子哥兒都有這種毛病，或許是因為生活太順暢太富裕，他們看問題往往好高騖遠，遇到挫折後又特別容易自暴自棄。對下屬喜歡輕易許下承諾，但應該兌現承諾時，他們卻又習慣逃避責任。
更遭糕的是，他人生的重心是放在政治上，能不能夠得到他所屬的政黨的提名和能不能在每一次選舉順利當選，比起他的證券公司能不能賺錢實在是重要一百倍。
於是，我的磨練就從此開始，因為我的專長與目標是幫公司投資賺錢，這和老闆的目標便產生了不一致的衝突。
事後回想，雙方主僱之間都沒有錯，錯的是，他找錯幹部，我謀錯差事👻。
（待續）
2021年10月21日 星期四
海龜6號 8436 大江 和 5287 數字科技
我第一次認識8436大江, 經由谷友介紹, 一翻開大江歷年營收成長和資產負債表
看了10分鐘, 心理頭有一股聲音響起
『泰欽 ~! 你看不出來這是一間好公司嗎, 假如看不出來, 你10年基本面白學了 @$%!@』
2019上半年420塊買進大江, 一度漲到520幾塊沒賣
(當時候正在練習獲利不要馬上了結 , 等待出場訊號)
後來不巧跌下來, 最後跌破400塊, 正式結束2年多頭走勢
當時成本還在高位約400塊以上, 但是部位小
我大約在360塊, 320塊各加碼一次, 投資部位明顯增大不少, 而持有成本一直在降低
後來又破300塊, 280塊有再接一次
1960-70 年代發生過什麼 ! , 再回過頭看2020 (二)
Summary of " The debt Myth" by Stephen kelton
the private sector might be reluctant to increase its indebtedness at various stages of the business cycle. Remember, households and businesses are currency users, not currency issuers, so they do need to worry about how they’re going to make their payments.
most Americans wanted to borrow less, not more. Millions of homeowners were underwater on their mortgages; they owed more than their homes were worth. After a long period of borrowing to finance spending in excess of its income, the private sector wanted relief from debt, not more debt. Without actually using the F-word (fiscal)
What matters is how the overall price of the basket changes from month to month and year to year, and whether average earnings are rising fast enough to keep up with rising prices.
People worry about
inflation because it can eat away at their real standard of living. You might
have no trouble affording the typical basket of goods today, but if the price
of that fixed basket starts rising, you may discover that you can no longer
afford to buy it. It depends what’s happening to your income. If the price of the basket keeps going up by 5 percent each
year while your annual earnings rise by just 2 percent, then in real
(inflation-adjusted) terms you’ll be 3 percent worse off each year. That
means a real loss in terms of the actual amount of stuff—real goods and
services—you can afford to buy.
A recession that could have been quickly reversed with the right fiscal prescription instead became the longest and most protracted downturn in the post–World War II era. To make sure that never happens again, MMT recommends a shift away from the current reliance on central banks to deliver on the twin goals of full employment and price stability
Functional finance
turned conventional wisdom on its head. Instead of
trying to force the economy to generate enough taxes to match federal spending,
Lerner urged policy makers to think in reverse. Taxes
and spending should be manipulated to bring the overall economy into balance.
That might require the government to add in (spend) more dollars than it
subtracts (taxes) away. It might even need to do this on an ongoing
basis, meaning sustained fiscal deficits over many years or even decades.
Lerner saw this as a perfectly responsible way to manage the government budget. As long as any resulting deficits didn’t push inflation
higher, the deficit shouldn’t be labeled overspending.
這一論點已經受到強烈挑戰, 2021年底10年國債飆升, 2021Q4 零售數字不如預期, 消費者受物價漲高影響, 2022年通膨可能繼續惡化
請先複習一下去年9月這篇
1960-70 年代發生過什麼 ! , 再回過頭看2020 ( 一 )
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/15/1959-all-over-again-why-this-could-be-another-historic-moment-for-the-market.html
The following table is sorted by Dividend Yield.
|
https://indexarb.com/dividendYieldSorteddj.html
SPDR Dow Jones
Industrial Average ETF - 21 Year Dividend History
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/DIA/spdr-dow-jones-industrial-average-etf/dividend-yield-history
In the history of yield-seeking investments, 1959 was a seminal year — the one in which bond yields and dividend yields flipped. The question investors must now contend with is whether they have finally flipped back.
It may not be one of those years that has widespread recognition among armchair market historians, such as 1929 or 1999, but 1959 was a critical one nonetheless. Before 1959, dividend yields on stocks were reliably above those of bonds. This made all the sense in the world in so far as stocks were seen as a riskier way to generate income; since they don’t come with the legal obligations that adhered to bond payments, dividend yields had to be higher as compensation for risk.
This is the simple explanation for the fact that whenever dividend yields slid to approach bond yields, as they did in 1898 and 1929, stock prices fell or bond prices rose such that the relationship between the one type of yield and the other was maintained.
It is no surprise, then, that when dividend yields approached bond yields again and actually rose above them in 1959, the old Wall Street hands had a clear prediction of what would happen.